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JURISDICTION
This appeal was within the appellate jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(j). The case was transferred to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. § 78-2-2 (4) by an order dated May 17, 2001. The
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-4 (2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the Court err in granting summary judgment on Jones and MTC's

claims relating to Fife's employment agreement by failing to recognize that the Stock
Purchase Agreement was incorporated by reference in the Settlement Agreement, and
erroneously concluding that the claim was moot? This issue seeks review of a grant of
summary judgment, and is therefore reviewed for correctness, according no deference to
the trial court's legal conclusions. Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d
1108 (Utah 1991). This issue was preserved on appeal in the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of CrossMotion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh and
Eighth Claims for Relief (hereinafter, "Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition"). (R.
933-37).
2.

Did the Court err in finding that Jones and MTC had failed to raise a

genuine issue of disputed fact regarding whether URI and Fife had used their best efforts
to unwind URI's relationship with Morgan Gas and Oil Morgan Oil claims. This issue
seeks review of a grant of summary judgment, and is therefore reviewed for correctness,
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according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Schurtz v. BMW of North
America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). This issue was preserved on appeal in the
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition. (R. 937-40).
3.

Did the Court err in granting summary judgment on Jones and MTC's

claims relating to the purported stock options of Hurd and Brown included in Schedule
2.2 to the Stock Purchase Agreement? This issue seeks review of a grant of summary
judgment, and is therefore reviewed for correctness, according no deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions. Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah
1991). This issue was preserved on appeal in the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition.
(R. 940-944).
4.

Did the Court err in granting summary judgment on Jones and MTC's

claims for payment of expenses by finding that Jones and MTC had failed to provide
admissible evidence of expenses covered by the Settlement Agreement, and by finding
that Jones had failed to raise a genuine issue of fact concerning URI's policy of
reimbursing Director expenses. This issue seeks review of a grant of summary judgment,
and is therefore reviewed for correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions. Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). This
issue was preserved on appeal in the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition. (R. 94445).
5.

Did the Court err in awarding the Defendants $162,028.87 of attorneys

fees? The determination that Defendants were the prevailing party and entitled to
attorneys fees is reviewed for correctness. First Southwestern Financial Services v.
-2-

Sessions, 875 P.2d 553, 554 (Utah 1994). The trial court's interpretation of the contract
provision relating to attorneys fees is also reviewed for correctness. Murdoch v.
Monumental Life Insurance Co., 2 P.3d 963, 965 (Utah App. 2000).

The court's

determination of the amount of the award is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Campbell v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (Utah, October 19,
2001). This issue was preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Judgment Order Awarding Attorney's Fees and Costs Against
Plaintiffs. (R. 1726-31).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
There are no constitutional, statutory, or other provisions of law, the interpretation
of which is determinative of the issues presented herein.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Background.

This lawsuit involves the operation and management of the Defendant Utah
Resources International, Inc. ("URI") and the conduct of four of its principals, John Fife
("Fife"), David Fife, Lyle D. Hurd, Jr. ("Hurd"), and Gerry Brown ("Brown"). The
action was brought by Mark Technologies Corp. ("MTC") and its controlling shareholder,
Mark Jones ("Jones"), who own collectively approximately 13 percent of the outstanding
shares of URI common stock. The lawsuit arises out of a Settlement Agreement1

*The Settlement Agreement was a global settlement of claims asserted by different parties
in three different lawsuits, including a case captioned Mark Technologies Corp., et al. v. Utah
Resources International, Inc., Civil no. 960903332 CV, which was then pending in the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah.
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executed on or about June 26, 1996, to which Jones, MTC, URI, Hurd, and Fife were all
signers. A copy of the Settlement Agreement is included in the addendum as Exhibit
"A." As provided by the Settlement Agreement, URI and Fife also entered into the Stock
Purchase Agreement, a copy of which is included in the record at page 717-759.
The purpose of this lawsuit was to seek judicial enforcement of several provisions
of the Settlement Agreement. Specifically, the Amended Complaint identified four areas
in which the Defendants had breached the Agreement: (1) failure to execute a written
employment agreement with Fife, as provided in paragraph l.f.xii of the Settlement
Agreement; (2) failure to unwind and/or terminate URFs contractual relationships with
Morgan Gas & Oil ("MGO"), as required by paragraph 1.1 of the Agreement; (3)
inclusion in a schedule to the Stock Purchase Agreement of stock options purportedly
held by Hurd and Brown which were never authorized or granted by URI; and (4) refusal
to pay various expenses incurred by MTC and Jones in connection with the Settlement
Agreement. The Amended Complaint raised these issues in ten separate claims for relief,
the following seven of which are at issue here:2
1.

Breach of Settlement Agreement (covenant of good faith and fair dealing)
relating to the Fife employment agreement.

2.

Breach of Settlement Agreement relating to the unwinding of URI's
relationship with MGO.

3-4.

Breach of Settlement Agreement relating to the purported stock options of
Hurd and Brown.

2

Jones and MTC do not appeal dismissal of the Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Claims for Relief,
and these claims are therefore not addressed herein.
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5.

Breach of Settlement Agreement relating to payment of clerical expenses
incurred in connection with the Settlement Agreement.

7.

Declaratory Judgment relating to the purported stock options of Hurd and
Brown.

10.

Breach of contract for failure to pay expenses incurred by Jones as a
Director of URL

B.

Procedural History,3

MTC and Jones filed their Complaint on January 20, 1998. (R. 1). Shortly after
the complaint was filed, the Defendants convened a meeting to address how they would
respond to the lawsuit. As a result of the meeting, URI entered a written employment
contract with Fife on February 27, 1998, a copy of which is included in the appendix as
Exhibit "B." On March 2, 1998, URI then obtained from Hurd and Brown written
waivers of any interest they may have claimed in the stock options that were the subject
of the lawsuit. (R. 687-88).
URI ultimately responded to the Complaint with a Motion to Dismiss the claims
relating to Fife's employment contract and the purported stock options of Hurd and
Brown on the basis that such claims were moot. (R. 55). It filed a separate Motion for
Summary Judgment on the remaining claims on March 3, 1998. (R. 164). Fife, David
Fife, Hurd and Brown joined in the Motions. (R. 167). The Court made two separate
rulings on these Motions. First, at the close of oral argument, the Court ruled from the
bench that (1) URI was not required to reimburse Jones for legal fees incurred after the

3

The statements contained herein can also be referenced to the entries on the docket which
is part of the record on appeal. All references to the record are to the first page of the relevant
document.
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execution of the Settlement Agreement; (2) Jones would bear the burden of proof on the
issue of a URI company policy to reimburse director expenses; and (3) Jones Rule 56 (f)
request for additional time to perform discovery would be granted and the Motion for
Summary Judgment would be denied. (R. 449-51). Several days later, the trial court
issued a Memorandum Decision denying the Motion to dismiss the claims relating to
Fife's employment agreement and the stock options, in which it stated as follows:
In this matter, URI failed to initiate its compliance with the
terms of the Settlement Agreement until after MTC filed suit,
approximately a year and a half after the date of the Agreement.
Presumably, it was because of the litigation that URI took the actions
to enter into the employment agreement and for defendants Hurd and
Brown to waive their URI stock options. These actions clearly
constitute unilateral actions by the defendants.
Further, in this matter, plaintiffs have alleged that they have
been created (sic) a valid employment agreement and valid waivers
of stock options. Whether the purported actions of defendants
satisfy these requirements are issues that remain to be resolved.
Finally, even if it is ultimately determined that the actions of
the defendants satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement,
the issue of plaintiffs' claim for attorneys fees and costs remains in
dispute.
(R. 460-61).
On August 17, 1998, the Defendants filed an Answer, which included
Counterclaims against MTC and Jones for breach of the Settlement Agreement and for
payment of attorneys fees. On the same day, Jones and MTC filed their Amended
Complaint and Demand for Jury. (R. 502). The Defendants Answered the Amended
Complaint on August 31, 1998. (R. 548).
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On January 1, 1999, Defendants filed a new Motion for Summary Judgment on all
claims. (R. 561). On June 11, 1999, MTC and Jones responded to that Motion and filed
a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on their First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh and
Eighth Claims for Relief. (R. 906, 910). The Motions were heard on November 12,
1999, and the Court entered a Memorandum Decision on January 5, 2000 granting
summary judgment and dismissing all of MTC and Jones' claims. (R. 1515, 1516).
On February 17, 2000, the Defendants moved for an order awarding attorneys fees
and costs against MTC and Jones. On March 17, 2000, the Defendants moved for
voluntary dismissal of count 1 of their Counterclaim. The Motion for voluntary dismissal
was granted by a minute entry dated November 17, 2000. (R. 1830). After briefing and
argument, the Motion for attorney's fees was granted by a Memorandum Decision dated
January 4, 2001.4 (R. 1834). A final Judgment Order was entered on February 26, 2001.
(R. 1927). MTC and Jones filed their Notice of Appeal on March 1, 2001. (R. 1933).
C.

Facts relevant to the issues on appeal.

The following facts are relevant to the issues presented on appeal.
1.

Facts relevant to Fife's employment agreement.

Paragraph l.f.xii of the Settlement Agreement provided as follows:
f
The transactions contemplated in the IMC letter of
Intent shall close in accordance with the provisions of that
contemplated Stock Purchase Agreement between URI and IMC (the
"Stock Purchase Agreement"), the current form of which is attached
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "C",

4

The Memorandum Decision was authored by Judge Pat Brian, who heard the matter in
place of Judge Stirba.
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subject to negotiation and execution of the definitive Stock Purchase
agreement and approval of its terms by the URI Board of Directors;
provided, however, that the definitive Stock Purchase Agreement
must contain the following material provisions:
*

a|e %

xii. URI shall hire Fife under a written employment
agreement which shall provide reasonable compensation for
services rendered, which compensation in any year shall not
exceed $200,000. The payment of compensation in excess of
that provided in the employment agreement shall be used to
reduce any obligations due or to come due under the Note.
(Addendum Exhibit "A," at 5, 7).
Following execution of the Settlement Agreement, URI did not immediately enter
a written employment agreement. Throughout the balance of 1996 and all of 1997, Jones
persistently requested that URI and Fife honor the agreement by executing a written
employment contract, but no contract was ever proposed or entered. (R. 963-64). In fact,
at one Board of Directors meeting in October of 1996, Hurd moved to table consideration
of the employment agreement, and the motion was approved over the objection of Jones.
(R. 998).
By correspondence dated November 7, 1996, Jones specifically requested that URI
and Fife negotiate and execute an employment agreement, and even provided a draft
agreement to begin the process. Jones received no response to his correspondence. (R.
963-64). In his deposition, Hurd could recall no discussions between Fife and URI
regarding the employment agreement from the time it was tabled in October of 1996 until
after the lawsuit was filed in January of 1998. (R. 1017-1018).
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On February 28, 1998, the Board of Directors of URI held a Special Meeting for
the purpose of considering a response to the lawsuit. (R. 1022). As a part of the Special
Meeting, the Board approved a resolution to enter an employment agreement. (R. 1026).
URI and Fife then executed an Employment Agreement, the complete text of which is as
follows:
Utah Resources International, Inc. ("URI") agrees to employ
John M. Fife as its president and chief executive officer on an at-will
basis commencing as of July 13, 1996 at an annual salary of
$195,000.00 per year.
(Addendum, Exhibit "B").
Fife admits that the employment agreement is skimpy as to the types of things that
would normally be included in such an agreement. (R. 1045). The salary figure of
$195,000.00 was merely "thrown out" by Fife, and the entire agreement was provided to
the Directors immediately before the Special Meeting, with only Fife performing some
minimal research beforehand regarding salaries of comparable executives. (R. 1038-40,
1040-41). No other member of the Board performed any other research of its own as to
the amount of salary that would be reasonable. (R. 1044). Although Fife claims that he
negotiated with the Board of Directors, neither he nor Hurd, who was also a director, was
aware of any Board member that had been appointed to conduct such a negotiations. (R.
1041-43; 1016-17). Moreover, there were no substantial discussions at the Special
Meeting regarding the amount of Fife's salary. (R. 1046).
2.

Facts relative to winding up the contractual relationships with MGO.

Paragraph 1.1 of the Settlement Agreement provided as follows:
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1.
Unless otherwise provided, the following events shall
occur at Closing (as defined herein):
* * *

1.
The Parties hereto shall exercise their best
efforts to account for, pay, compromise, unwind, and/or
terminate all existing contractual relationships between URI
and Morgan Gas & Oil Co.
(Addendum, Exhibit "A," at 3, 8).
At the time of the Settlement Agreement, URI was involved in various partnerships
with MGO and was obligated to MGO on various notes. (R. 923, 1087). From the time
of the Settlement Agreement, throughout the balance of 1996 and throughout all of 1997,
Jones requested that URI, Fife and Hurd comply with the Settlement Agreement by taking
action to wind up the relationship with MGO. (R. 966). In fact, in June of 1997, Jones
made a motion in one of the cases settled by the Settlement Agreement requesting the
Court to enforce the Settlement Agreement by ordering URI, Fife and Hurd to wind up
the relationship with MGO. URI opposed the Motion. (R. 964). Shortly thereafter, Fife
told Jones that URI would never pay money to MGO to wind up the relationship unless
MGO filed a lawsuit. (R. 1099). By separate letters dated August 21, 1997 and October
10, 1997, Jones requested in writing that URI comply with the Settlement Agreement
with regard to MGO. (R. 1099). Jones received no response to his requests. (R. 1099).
Throughout the period, URI provided no information to Jones or its other directors on any
actions it had taken or was planning to take to wind up the relationship with MGO, and
ignored all requests from Jones and MTC for information concerning such actions. (R.
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966). As of the time the Complaint was filed, no substantial action had been taken to
unwind the relationship with MGO.
At the February 27, 1998 Special Meeting called by the Board of Directors to
formulate a response to this lawsuit, Fife made a motion for a resolution authorizing
URI's officers to use their best efforts to wind up the contractual relationships with MGO
by the end of 1998, which action had never previously been taken. (R. 1026). At his
deposition, Fife testified that he believed such a resolution was necessary in order to go
forward in winding up the relationship. (R. 1055-57).
On June 25, 1998, the trial court heard argument on URI's first Motion for
Summary Judgment relative to the MGO claim, and denied the Motion. (R. 449-51).
The following week, Fife and URI began efforts to unwind the relationship. (R. 925).
URI and Fife ultimately scheduled a conference call for July 15, 1998, and on July 20,
1998, Fife made a written proposal to MGO. (R. 1108-09). The July 20, 1998 proposal
consisted of less than two pages and was the first proposal made by URI since the
Settlement Agreement was entered two years earlier. (R. 1061-62).
After brief discussions, Fife made a revised proposal on August 1, 1998, which
MGO's president verbally approved. (R. 1110-13). The parties made further revisions to
the proposal and drafted a Letter of Intent dated August 21, 1998 which was approved by
URI's Board of Directors on September 2, 1998. (R. 926). The process was completed
when the parties executed a Partnership Settlement Agreement on December 15, 1998.
(R. 597-606).
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3.

Facts relevant to the purported stock options of Hurd and Brown.

In 1994, URI's Board of Directors approved a Stock Option Plan under which
Hurd and Brown, among others, received options on 25,000 shares of URI stock. (R.
1136-37). The parties appear to agree that other than these options granted under this
plan, the Company has not granted any additional options. (R. 576; 1253-57).
Pursuant to section l.f.xiii of the Settlement Agreement, the Stock Purchase
Agreement was provided to Jones and MTC prior to its execution. At that time, Schedule
2.2 of the Stock Purchase Agreement was blank, and Jones understood that it would be
completed to reflect only the outstanding options granted under the Stock Option Plan.
(R. 1100). When the Stock Purchase Agreement was approved by URI's Board of
Directors on July 3, 1996, Schedule 2.2 was still blank. (R. 1100). Sometime shortly
after July 3, 1996, a completed Schedule 2.2. was appended to the executed agreement
which reflected that Hurd and Brown each held options on 50,000 shares of URI stock.
(R. 1100).
At a meeting of the Board of Directors dated July 30, 1996, Jones requested a
review to determine whether the additional 25,000 options of Hurd and Brown reflected
on the Schedule were valid. (R. 1143). Hurd and Brown took the position that the
options were valid and were granted to them as part of their employment agreements with
URI. (R. 928). Upon review, Fife was unable to find any Board authorization for the
options, and Fife agrees that the options could not have been granted without such
authorization. (R. 1054). Discovery in the case failed to produce any evidence that the
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options had been granted, and the public filings of URJ expressly state that there is no
long-term incentive compensation plan other than the Stock Option Plan. (R. 929).
Throughout 1997, Jones raised this issue with URI and its Board of Directors, but
no action was taken. (R. 930). Shortly after the lawsuit was filed, however, the Board of
Directors directed Brown and Hurd to waive their additional options, which they did by a
written document dated March 2, 1998. (R. 687-88).
4.

Facts relative to Jones and MTC's claims for payment of expenses.

Paragraph l.h.i. of the Settlement Agreement provides as follows:
1.
Unless otherwise provided, the following events shall
occur at Closing (as defined herein):
* * *

h.
Legal fees and expenses and other costs
associated with the pending Litigation and the documents and
negotiations to complete and implement the settlement
contemplated by this Agreement shall be paid as follows:
(i)
All legal fees, costs and out-of-pocket
expenses incurred or paid by Jones, IMC, Fife,
Erickson, Sheen, Hurd and MTC from January
1, 1996 to Closing shall be reimbursed or paid
by URI.
(R. 979-80).
On June 28, 1996, Jones and MTC provided to URI a summary of expenses for
which they sought reimbursement. The request included time entries for Patricia Lee and
Karen Pliszka, employees of MTC, for time incurred prior to the Closing. (R. 1101).
The total amount sought as reimbursement for the services of Ms. Lee and Ms. Pliszka
was $5,991.00. (R. 1101). Jones later provided written documentation of these expenses,
-13-

including copies of weekly time sheets. (R. 1155-88). URI has refused or otherwise
failed to reimburse these expenses.
Jones has also submitted expenses incurred in performing his duties as a Director,
requesting a total of $44,313.63. (R. 933, 1203-21). Jones provided the trial court with
the following evidence that it was URTs policy to reimburse directors for such expenses:
(1) Jones testified that he understood as a director that his expenses would be reimbursed,
and that the Company has never adopted a policy requiring pre-approval of expenses (R.
1102-03); (2) E. Jay Sheen was paid $102,000.00 in 1995 (R. 1102); R. Dee Erikson was
paid $102,000.00 in 1995, and was reimbursed for such items as postage, copy services,
telephone calls, supplies and other expenses (R. 1102, 1189-1202); URI pays rent on
Fife's office in Chicago without pre-approval (R. 1075).
5.

Facts relative to the award of attorneys fees.

There are no additional facts necessary for consideration of the award of attorneys
fees to be set forth, except as may be referenced in the body of the argument below.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Jones and MTC contend that the trial court erred in dismissing on summary
judgment the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Claims for Relief of
the Amended Complaint.
Jones and MTC contend that the Settlement Agreement, when read together with
the Stock Purchase Agreement which was expressly incorporated therein, clearly
obligates URI and Fife to enter a written employment agreement, which they failed to do.
It was error for the trial court to hold that URI and Fife discharged their contractual
-14-

obligation to Jones and MTC in this regard merely by including language requiring a
contract in the Stock Purchase Agreement.
Jones and MTC contend that the trial court erred in holding that no genuine issue
of material fact existed as to whether URI and Fife had used their best efforts to unwind
URI's relationship with MGO. In light of the extensive evidence presented by Jones
establishing, directly and by inference, that URI and Fife ignored the MGO relationship
until after the lawsuit was filed, it was error for the trial court to find that no genuine
issue of fact was presented for trial.
Jones and MTC contend that the trial court erred in dismissing its Third, Fourth,
and Seventh Claims for Relief relative to stock options which were included in Schedule
2.2 of the Stock Purchase Agreement, even though they had never been authorized or
granted by the company. The Third Claim for Relief properly establishes that the
erroneous inclusion of the options violated provision of the Settlement Agreement
requiring execution of the Stock Purchase Agreement in proper form and subject to
Jones' review. The trial court dismissed the claim on the mistaken belief that Jones and
MTC were required to show an affirmative duty to cancel the options, which is not
present in the Stock Purchase Agreement. The Fourth Claim for Relief properly
establishes that Hurd's claimed entitlement to his options as part of an employment
contract violated provisions of the Settlement Agreement denying effect to or otherwise
terminating any such employment agreements. The trial court erred in dismissing this
claim on the mistaken belief that the Jones and MTC were required to demonstrate that an
employment agreement had actually been consummated. Finally, although Jones and
-15-

MTC acknowledge that their claim for declaratory relief has been rendered moot by Hurd
and Brown's voluntary waivers of their options, they contend that they are thus the
prevailing parties on this claim and are entitled to an award of attorneys fees.
Jones and MTC contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their claim for
expenses incurred in connection with the Settlement Agreement. The trial court erred in
concluding that no evidence had been presented to establish the claim, because Jones'
sworn affidavit testimony and back-up documents, together with the plain language of the
Settlement Agreement, establish Jones and MTC's entitlement to payment. Jones also
contends that the Court erred in dismissing his claim for reimbursement of expenses
incurred as a Director. Jones presented sufficient evidence to establish that URI's policy
was to reimburse its Directors, and that he is entitled to recover on this claim.
Finally, Jones and MTC contend that the trial court erred in awarding attorneys
fees of $162,028.87. To the extent that the judgment was based on a claim of mootness,
Jones and MTC were actually the prevailing parties because Defendants acquiesced in
their claims after commencement of the case. The award was also erroneous because it
failed to allocate fees to account for claims upon which there was no entitlement to fees
or upon which Defendants were not the prevailing party. Finally, the award was
improper because the amount of fees should have been reduced to account for duplicative
and unnecessary expenditures of time by the numerous attorneys representing
Defendants.
Jones and MTC request that this Court vacate the judgment of the trial court and
remand the matter for a trial on the merits of these claims.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
REGARDING FIFE'S EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT.

The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims regarding Fife's employment
agreement, holding that although the Settlement Agreement expressly required that the
Stock Purchase Agreement must include language requiring URI to enter an employment
contract with Fife, it did not independently require that an employment agreement
actually be entered. Thus, the trial court held that Defendants performed all of the terms
of the Settlement Agreement relating to the employment contract when they included the
required provision in the text of the Stock Purchase Agreement. Based on its assertion
that Jones and MTC did not have the right to enforce the Stock Purchase Agreement, the
trial court thus dismissed the claims on summary judgment. Jones and MTC contend
herein that the trial court erred, and that the Plaintiffs should have prevailed on their
claims relating to the employment agreement.
A.

The Stock Purchase Agreement was incorporated by reference as part of the
Settlement Agreement.

As a starting point for discussion, Jones and MTC submit that the trial court erred
in holding that Jones and MTC could not enforce the terms of the Stock Purchase
Agreement. The substantive terms of the Stock Purchase Agreement were precisely the
consideration for which Jones and MTC bargained, as made plain in paragraph l.f. of the
Settlement Agreement. Moreover, the Stock Purchase Agreement was expressly
incorporated as a part of the Settlement Agreement as follows:
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f.
The transactions contemplated in the IMC Letter of
Intent shall close in accordance with the provisions of that
contemplated Stock Purchase Agreement between URI and IMC (the
"Stock Purchase Agreement"), the current form of which is attached
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "C."
(R. 977)(emphasis added).
Under Utah law, contracting parties may incorporate other documents by
reference, and the documents thus become a part of the contract. Consolidated Realty
Group, v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268 (Utah App. 1997). In this regard, the case
of Zions First National Bank v. Allen, 688 F.Supp. 1495 (D. Utah 1988) is instructive. In
that case, the plaintiffs sought to establish jurisdiction under a partnership agreement
which was not signed by any defendant. Id. at 1498. The Court noted, however, that
since each defendant had signed a subscription agreement which incorporated the
partnership agreement by reference, the forum selection clause contained in the
partnership agreement could be enforced against them. Id. See also ladanza v. Mather,
820 F.Supp. 1371, 1386 (D. Utah 1993)(applying Utah law and holding that where an
interrelated document is intended to be incorporated by reference as part of the same
transaction, the contracts are to be construed as a whole).
In this case, the Stock Purchase Agreement was expressly incorporated into the
Settlement Agreement by reference, and the terms of the Stock Purchase Agreement thus
became a substantive part of the Settlement Agreement. As such, the Defendants were
not merely obligated to put acceptable language regarding the employment contract into
the Stock Purchase Agreement, but were in fact bound to enter a written employment
contract.
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Jones and MTC submit that the trial court's refusal to incorporate the terms of the
Stock Purchase Agreement into the Settlement Agreement eviscerates the intentions of the
parties in two ways. First, it reads the express incorporation of the Stock Purchase
Agreement completely out of the Settlement Agreement by flatly ignoring its presence.
And second, it frustrates the purpose of the contract for Jones and MTC who clearly
bargained for a requirement that an employment contract be negotiated and entered, but
would instead only receive nothing more than an empty promise to write the obligation
into a separate document which they could not enforce. Jones and MTC submit that
where the Settlement Agreement expressly incorporates the terms of the Stock Purchase
Agreement, they are entitled to enforce the terms of the Stock Purchase Agreement and
thus vindicate the benefit of their bargain. This Court should reverse the trial court with
regard to the employment contract claim, and the matter should be returned to the trial
court for a determination.
B.

The Defendants breached the Settlement Agreement with regard to Fife's
employment contract.

Accepting that Jones and MTC were entitled to enforce the contract to enter an
employment agreement, there remains very little question that a breach occurred. For
approximately 20 months following the execution of the Settlement Agreement, Jones
and MTC requested that an agreement be drafted and executed. Only after the filing of
this litigation did Defendants undertake to comply, and even then, they did so in a onesentence agreement, drafted without substantial negotiation or input as to terms, the
inadequacy and unreasonableness of which is virtually apparent on its face. Jones and
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MTC urge this Court to rule that a breach has occurred, and that the case therefore must
be returned to the trial court only for the limited purpose of ascertaining a proper
remedy.5
II.

THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
REGARDING THE WINDING UP OF URI'S RELATIONSHIP WITH
MGO.

The trial court's entire opinion with regard to the MGO relationship was as
follows:
The Settlement Agreement requires that "[t]he parties hereto
shall exercise their best efforts to account for, pay, compromise,
unwind and/or terminate all existing contractual relationships
between URI and Morgan Gas and Oil." Plaintiffs allege defendants
took no meaningful action to wind up until this lawsuit was filed.
However, URI presented uncontroverted evidence that it had been in
the process of unwinding the partnerships identified in the
Settlement Agreement, according to the terms of the Agreement, for
an extended time prior to the filing of Plaintiffs' lawsuit.
(R. 1520). In effect, the trial court ruled that the all of the evidence presented by Jones
and MTC was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether URI and
Fife had exercised their best efforts to wind up URI's relationship with MGO.
Jones and MTC contend herein that the trial court's ruling was error as a matter of
law. On a motion for summary judgment, it is inappropriate for the trial court to weigh
disputed material facts, and it does not matter that evidence on one side of issue may

In their Amended Complaint, Jones and MTC have prayed for an order of specific
performance of the contract and for damages as may be proven Jones and MTC would note that
even if no actual or substantial damages are ultimately proven, they would nevertheless be entitled
to nominal damages as a matter of law Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc.,
645 P 2d 667 (Utah 1982)
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appear to be strong or even compelling; one sworn statement is all that is needed to raise
create an issue of fact precluding summary judgment. Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark,
755 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1988). Thus, courts may consider only those facts that are
genuinely not in dispute, and may enter judgment only when facts upon which judgment
is based are clearly established or admitted. Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 458 (Utah
1978). Moreover, if there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning a question of fact, that
doubt must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party, with all evidence and all
inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence drawn in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982).
In this case, Jones and MTC presented substantial evidence establishing that URI
and Fife did not use their best efforts to unwind the MGO relationship. Without entirely
restating the relevant facts set forth above, Jones and MTC submit that they have shown
(1) that during the 19 months between the execution of the Settlement Agreement and the
filing of the lawsuit, Jones continually requested, both orally and in writing, that URI and
Fife take action toward unwinding the MGO relationship without any response from URI
or Fife whatsoever; (2) that URI opposed Jones and MTC's effort to enforce the
Settlement Agreement in the underlying action as it related to unwinding the MGO
relationship; (3) that Fife told Jones that URI would never pay money to MGO to unwind
the relationship unless MGO filed a lawsuit, even though money was clearly owing from
URI to MGO; (4) that the MGO relationship was not discussed in Directors meetings and
no information was provided to Directors regarding the relationship until after the lawsuit
was filed; (5) that no written proposal or correspondence was exchanged between URI
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and MGO until July of 1998, immediately after the trial court denied URI's Motion to
Dismiss the claim; (6) that the first Board action to authorize Fife to deal with the MGO
issue was taken at the February 27, 1998 Special Meeting called by the Board of
Directors in response to this lawsuit, even though Fife believed that such a resolution was
necessary to go forward in unwinding the MGO relationship; (7) that immediately after
the trial court denied URI's Motion to Dismiss the MGO Claim, Fife and URI contacted
MGO and were able to reach an agreement in principal to wind up the relationship within
no more than a few days.
Jones and MTC submit that the trial court's assertion that Defendants provided
"incontroverted" evidence that they were working on the issue before the lawsuit was
filed simply cannot justify summary judgment in the face of the evidence summarized
above. This evidence, together with the inferences that can be drawn therefrom, directly
controvert the self-serving and conclusory statements of Fife and Hurd to the effect that
they were generally working on issues relating to the MGO relationship throughout the
period. In short, the fact-sensitive inquiry of whether URI, Fife and Hurd employed their
"best efforts" to unwind the MGO relationship prior to the filing of the lawsuit is the
subject of substantial evidence on both sides of the issue, and the trial court erred in
finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact remaining in dispute.
III.

THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING THE STOCK OPTION CLAIMS.

Jones and MTC asserted three claims arising from the inclusion in Schedule 2.2 of
the Stock Purchase Agreement of 25,000 stock options each for Hurd and Brown which
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were never authorized or issued by URL The Third Claim for Relief alleged that
inclusion of the purported options on Schedule 2.2 violated paragraph l.f. of the
Settlement Agreement, which made closing of the Stock Purchase Agreement an essential
term of the settlement, and incorporated the Stock Purchase Agreement by reference. The
Fourth Claim for Relief alleged that inclusion of the purported options on Schedule 2.2
violated paragraph l.j. of the Settlement Agreement which provided that any employment
agreement of Hurd that had been contemplated, negotiated or executed would not be
effectuated, and if already effectuated, would be terminated. The Seventh Claim for
Relief sought a declaratory judgment that the purported options were void.6
The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing Jones and MTC's Third
Claim for Relief addressing the purported stock options of Hurd and Brown solely
because it observed that the Settlement Agreement contains no express term obligating
URI, Brown, or Hurd to rescind stock options. The trial court relied in particular on its
observation that the Settlement Agreement was an integrated agreement, and thus not
subject to the addition of any terms not expressly contained therein.
Jones and MTC contend that the trial court's ruling manifests a fundamental
misreading of the Third Claim for Relief. The breach of contract for which Jones and
MTC seek relief is not the failure to rescind or redact the purported options, but the
inclusion of the options in Schedule 2.2 in the first instance. Jones contends that
inclusion in the Schedule of options that had not been authorized or granted by the

6

Jones and MTC's sixth, eighth, and ninth claims also address the purported options but
are not a subject of this appeal and therefore not discussed herein.
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Company breached paragraph l.f. of the Settlement Agreement which provided for
execution of the Stock Purchase Agreement in the specified form and upon review by
Jones.
As described above, the Stock Purchase Agreement was incorporated by reference
into the Settlement Agreement, and the closing of the Stock Purchase Agreement was a
material term of the settlement. Paragraph l.f.xiii of the Settlement Agreement also
provided that the final Stock Purchase Agreement would be provided to Jones for review
at least two days prior to closing. When the Settlement Agreement and the Stock
Purchase Agreement were circulated to Jones, when the Settlement Agreement was
executed, and when the Stock Purchase Agreement was presented to URTs board of
directors, Schedule 2.2. setting forth all outstanding stock options was left blank. As
such, Jones and MTC executed the Settlement Agreement on the assumption that
Schedule 2.2 would set forth the 150,000 options granted undertitleStock Option Plan
and no others. Jones and MTC contend that is was a breach of the Settlement Agreement
for URI, Hurd, Brown, and Fife to append a new Schedule 2.2 to the Stock Purchase
Agreement setting forth new options in favor of Hurd and Brown that were never
authorized or granted by the company. Nothing in paragraph l.f. allows URI, Fife, Hurd
and Brown to use the Stock Purchase Agreement as a vehicle for granting options not
authorized by the Board of Directors, and their conduct in doing so constitutes a breach.
As a fall-back position, the trial court noted that because Hurd and Brown
executed waivers of their options in March of 1998, the issue would be moot. Jones and
MTC submit that this assertion fails for two reasons. First, although Hurd and Brown's
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post-Complaint waivers may render moot any claim for specific performance, the waiver
does not render moot a claim for damages, since nominal damages are always available in
a contract action, even where no actual damage has been suffered. Turtle Management
Inc, v. Haggis Management Inc., 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). Moreover, where the filing
of the Complaint was necessary to bring about the parties' compliance with the
Settlement Agreement, Jones and MTC should be deemed the prevailing parties on the
claim, and would thereby be entitled to recover attorneys fees under the contract. See
Highland Construction Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1981)(holding that it
makes no substantive difference in determining entitlement to attorneys fees if one
becomes a prevailing party by obtaining a judgment or as a result of voluntary action of
the opposing party after the filing of a Complaint).
Jones and MTC's Fourth Claim for Relief was based upon section l.j. of the
Settlement Agreement which provides as follows:
All employment agreements contemplated, negotiated or
executed between URI and Sheen, Hurd, and Erickson shall not be
effectuated and if effectuated, shall be terminated.
(R. 980). The trial court dismissed this claim on the basis that "none of the
aforementioned individuals have given effect to any employment agreements.
Consequently, there was nothing to terminate." (R. 1521).
Again, the trial court has misconstrued the Fourth Claim for Relief. Jones and
MTC were not requesting the trial court to terminate the employment contract of Hurd.
They were merely arguing that where Hurd had testified that he received the options as
part of an employment agreement (R. 1008-09), it was a breach of Section l.j. of the
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Settlement Agreement to give effect to the alleged employment agreement by including
the options in the Schedule.
In short, the trial court's mistaken understanding of the Third and Fourth Claims
for Relief lead it to dismiss the claims without ever really considering the substance of
the claims. Jones and MTC submit that the record includes substantial evidence
establishing that the inclusion of the purported options in Schedule 2.2 to the Stock
Purchase Agreement ran afoul of the contractual obligations undertaken in the Settlement
Agreement, and urges the Court to return the matter to the trial court for a resolution on
the merits.
The Seventh Claim for Relief seeks a declaratory judgment in the form of an order
declaring that the options are void. Hurd and Brown essentially acquiesced in this claim
when they executed waivers of their options in March of 1998. Jones and MTC thus
agree with the trial court's substantive ruling that execution of the waivers rendered the
underlying claim for declaratory judgment moot. Jones and MTC would point out,
however, that insofar as the claim arose from the Settlement Agreement, Jones and MTC,
as the prevailing parties, are entitled to recover their attorneys fees. Jones and MTC
request that the issue be remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of addressing
the issue of attorneys fees.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING JONES AND MTC'S
CLAIMS FOR PAYMENT OF EXPENSES.

Jones and MTC's Fifth Claim for Relief seeks reimbursement of expenses they
incurred in connection with the Settlement Agreement. The Tenth Claim for Relief seeks
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reimbursement of expenses incurred by Jones in his capacity as a Director of URI. Jones
and MTC appeal the dismissal of both claims.
A.

Jones and MTC are entitled to recover expenses incurred in connection with
the Settlement Agreement.

Paragraph 1 .h.(i) of the Settlement Agreement provides for payment of all of
Jones' expenses "associated with the Pending Litigation and the documents and
negotiations to complete and implement the settlement" incurred between January 1,
1996 and Closing. Pursuant to this provision, Jones prepared and submitted detailed
statements of his expenses, a portion of which were then paid by URI. In dispute here are
expenses for time expended by two MTC employees, Karen Pliszka and Patricia Lee,
totaling $5,991.20 for clerical expenses incurred in connection with the Settlement
Agreement.
The trial court dismissed the claims of Jones and MTC for these expenses on the
basis that Plaintiffs had failed to "present admissible evidence of any expenses, costs and
fees properly submitted for payment during this time." The trial court noted that Jones
and MTC had even admitted that at least some of the costs may have included costs
incurred after the closing.
Jones and MTC submit that the trial court clearly erred in granting summary
judgment on these claims. The trial court's decision tacitly acknowledges that Jones and
MTC did submits statements for payment. Moreover, Mark Jones stated by affidavit that
he provided to URI a summary of fees, costs, and out-of-pocket expenses with
documentation from January 1, 1996 through Jun 30, 1996, which included clerical
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expenses of $5,991.00. (R. 1101-02). Jones further testified that he provided weekly
time sheets for the relevant employees, which time sheets are also a part of the record.
(R. 1155-88).
In the face of this sworn testimony and the clear language of the Settlement
Agreement, the trial court could not reasonably conclude that Jones and MTC's claim
failed to raise a genuine issue of disputed fact. The summary judgment should be vacated
with regard to this claim, the matter remanded for the trial court to fix the precise amount
of expenses recoverable by Jones and MTC.
B.

Jones is entitled to recover expenses incurred as a Director of URI.

The Tenth Claim for relief is similar. Jones has asserted that he is entitled to
reimbursement of expenses incurred as a Director of URI. Defendants have opposed the
claim, arguing that URPs policy does not allow for reimbursement of expenses without
prior authorization. The trial court concluded that Jones failed to discharge his burden of
presenting evidence to refute URI's position, and dismissed the case.
Jones submits that the evidence he presented, particularly in light of the inferences
that can be drawn therefrom, was sufficient to raise a material issue of fact. Specifically,
Jones presented testimony that he understood as a director that his expenses would be
reimbursed, and that during his tenure as a Director, the Company did not have a policy
requiring pre-approval of expenses. He further presented evidence that Directors E. Jay
Sheen and R. Dee Erikson were paid $102,000.00 in 1995, and that Erikson was
reimbursed for such items as postage, copy services, telephone calls, supplies and other
expenses throughout his tenure as a Director. Jones further presented evidence that URI
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pays rent on Fife's office in Chicago without pre-approval. In short, Jones provided
evidence that based on his experience as a Director and the general course of operation of
the company there has never been a policy that Director expenses must be pre-approved.
Jones submits that this evidence is more than sufficient to raise a disputed issue of
material fact, and the trial court erred in dismissing the Tenth Claim for Relief.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING $162,028.87 OF COSTS
AND ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE DEFENDANT.

Following the trial court's Memorandum Decision granting summary judgment,
Defendants moved for an award of attorneys fees. The trial court, after briefing and
argument, determined that Defendants were the prevailing party and awarded fees in the
amount of $162,028.87. Jones and MTC submit that the fee award was improper and
should be vacated.
A.

Defendants were not the prevailing party.

It is axiomatic that if the trial court's ruling on the underlying claims discussed
above is vacated, the fee award must be vacated as well. Jones and MTC also
acknowledge that if the trial courts' judgment is affirmed on grounds other than
mootness, Defendants would be entitled to some award of fees under the Settlement
Agreement as prevailing parties. Jones and MTC submit, however, that to the extent the
award is based on mootness, it was error to conclude that Defendants were prevailing
parties, and the fee award must be reversed.
The trial court's dismissal of the Third and Fourth claims for relief were based in
part on the mootness of the claims resulting from Hurd and Brown's voluntary waiver of
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their purported stock options. The dismissal of the Seventh Claim for Relief was based
entirely on mootness, the trial court concluding that "a declaration is unnecessary as all
parties who plaintiffs contend have claims for stock options have disclaimed any such
interest." (R. 1523). On these claims, Jones and MTC submit that it was error for the
trial court to determine that Defendants were the prevailing party.
A similar issue was addressed in Highland Construction Co. v. Stevenson, 636
P.2d 1034 (Utah 1981). In that case, the plaintiff sued for damages arising from a
construction agreement. After the complaint was filed, but before judgment, the
defendant admitted that he owed money and voluntarily paid. Id. at 1038. The plaintiff
then requested attorneys fees on the claim, asserting that it was the prevailing party. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court wrote as follows:
It should make no difference whether the plaintiff recovers
money from the defendant during the course of action by voluntary
payment or whether the plaintiff recovers that amount by a
judgment. In both instances, the plaintiff has recovered money by
virtue of its action. In the instant case, the $10,300.78 was long past
due when paid by [defendant] and since it was paid, albeit
voluntarily, after plaintiffs action was commenced the plaintiff
Highland was indeed the "prevailing party" on that particular cause
of action.
Id
In this case, Jones and MTC were clearly the prevailing panties on the Seventh
Claim for Relief, and to the extent that the Third and Fourth Claims for Relief were
dismissed based on mootness, Jones and MTC are the prevailing parties there as well.
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The fee award must be vacated and remanded to reconsider the award with Jones and
MTC deemed the prevailing parties as described herein.7
B.

The fee award should be vacated for failure to allocate fees.

The Utah Supreme Court has required those seeking attorneys fees to allocate their
fees as follows:
[W]e have mandated that a party seeking fees must allocate its
fee request according to its underlying claims. Indeed, the party
must categorize the time and fees expended for (1) successful claims
for which there may be entitlement to attorneys fees; (2)
unsuccessful claims for which there would have been entitlement to
attorneys fees had the claims been successful; and (3) claims for
which there is no entitlement to attorneys fees.
Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). In Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,
318 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court held that it was error to award the full amount
of fees incurred where some of the time was spent on unsuccessful issues.
In this case, the Court erred in refusing to require the Plaintiff to allocate its fees in
two respects. First, the award ultimately included fees incurred on the Sixth, Eighth and
Ninth Claims for relief, which were not based upon the contract and upon which there
was therefore no entitlement to fees. Second, the award also included fees that were
incurred in pursuing issues upon which the Defendants did not actually prevail. For
instance, Defendants' initial motions to dismiss for mootness were unsuccessful, Count 1
of Defendants' Counterclaim was voluntarily dismissed, and Plaintiffs Seventh Claim for

7

Jones and MTC would note that the although the trial court did not rely on the doctrine
of mootness in dismissing the First Claim for Relief, the same analysis would apply since Fife and
URI clearly executed the employment agreement as a direct result of the lawsuit.
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Relief was dismissed only because Defendants' acquiescence rendered it moot. The fee
award should be remanded so that an appropriate allocation can be conducted.
C.

The amount of the fee award was unreasonable.

In simplest terms, Jones and MTC contend that Plaintiffs attorneys fees and costs
in this matter of over $160,000.00 were grossly excessive in light of the work actually
required on the case. The trial court recited the applicable legal standard from Barker v.
Utah Public Service Commission, 970 P.2d 702, 708 (Utah 1998), but did not address any
of the specific items raised in Jones and MTC's detailed Memorandum. In light of the
trial court's failure directly to address the issues raised, Jones and MTC request this
Court to conduct its own review.
Jones and MTC submit that the billings were unreasonable and the trial court erred
in awarding the full amount for the following reasons. First, the involvement of two
firms and at least 8 total lawyers inevitably resulted in inefficiencies and duplication. For
example, entries for Alan Roth at $240.00 per hour dated January 21, 22, 23; February 2,
11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, and 26; March 3; April 7 and 14; May 1, 4 and 5; June
1, 26 and 30; July 8, 9 and 17; and August 4, 5, 6, 9, 10 and 20, 1998, were all incurred
in reviewing papers, meeting with other counsel, and other similar activities, none of
which directly contributed to moving the action forward. Similarly, entries throughout
February and March of 1998 show repeated entries for attorney meetings and reviewing
of pleadings, none of which would typically be required if the case were assigned to a
two or three-person litigation team.
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Second, Chicago billing rates and travel time should have been adjusted to reflect
the rates that would have reasonably been charged in the Salt Lake market. The Utah
Supreme Court in Barker included "the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
legal services" as a consideration in making a fee award. Id at 708. Certainly Jones and
MTC do not challenge Defendants' right to select out of state counsel to conduct
litigation in Utah if they so desire. When that choice multiplies fees beyond what would
be acceptable "in the locality," however, such fees are not recoverable under Barker, and
must be born by the Defendants.
Third, Jones and MTC submit that local counsel costs, which in this case included
entries for attendance at hearings without participation, review of documents transmitted
for filing, and participation in attorney conferences should not be allowed. Jones and
MTC contend that fees for local counsel should only be awarded for entries where it can
be established that local counsel contributed something more than just its physical
presence as an accommodation for the out of state lawyers. Again, it is clearly a party's
choice to hire out of state counsel, but the additional costs that accrue as a result of that
choice should not be included in an award of reasonable attorneys fees.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, Jones and MTC urge this Court to reverse
the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand the case for a trial on the merits.
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lis /J) day of November, 2001.
DATED this

WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C.

rid W.lLambertjy N \ j
Attorney for Jone§ and MTC
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
This certifies that I did deliver a true and correct copy of the BRIEF OF
APPELLANT to the following by first class U.S. Mail thisTgr. day of November, 2001:
Rebecca S. Parr
BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY
170 South Main, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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EXHIBIT "A"

EXHIBIT A
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") is entered into the
1996 among the foUowing parties (collectively referred to herein is the "Paracj"):
1.

Utah Resources Intcmadoaal, Inc., a Utah corporation ("URI").

2.

K_ Do: Erickson ("Erickson").

3.

E. Jay Sheen ("Sheen").

4.

LyleD.HurdC'Hurd").

5.

Mark G. Jone* ('Jones").

6.

Mark Technologies Corporation, a California corporation ("MTC").

7.

Anne Morgan ("A Morgan").

8.

Victoria Morgan ("V Morgan").

9.

Lnter-MountsLa Capital Corp., a Deli ware- corporation ("IMC").

10.

John Fife ("Fife").

11.

Robinson & Sheen, L L C .

dzy of

RECITALS
A.
The Panies arc involved in various disputes and controversies involving the
operation, management, ownership or"a:u* business activities of URI, including, but not limned
r0} matters which art the subject of the First State Action, the Second State Action and the First
Pcdaral Action as defined below (collectively, the 'Tending Litigation").
B.
A shareholders derivative action captioned as Ernest Muth. et af. v. John H.
^Ar03i\JL ctal. was filed as Civil Number C-S7-1632 in the Third Judicial District Court of
iSilt Lake County, Utah (the "First State Action").
C.
A settlement agreement was entered into in the First Stale Action on April 6, 1993
(the "1993 Settlement Agreement").
D.
Subsequently, URI brought an action to enforce the 1993 Settlement Agreement
tin the First State Action which resulted in certain findings of fact and conclusions of law and an
rorder enforcing the Settlement Agreement entered by Judge Michael R. Murphy on October 4,
:99S (the "Murphy OrderH). Tnc Murphy Order has been appealed by Hi Morgan and
OR Morgan and cross-appealed by URI.
E.
An Order to Show Cause has been filed in the First State Action by URI against
[H Morgan, DR Morgan, Mark Jones, MTC, .Anne Morgan and Victoria Morgan, which is
sending.
F.
A shareholders derivative action captioned as Anne Morgan ci. al v. R. Dee
Erickson et. al was filed as Case Number 2:95CV-0661C in the United States District Court for
the District of Utah, Central Division (the "First Federal Action").
G.
Pursuant to a Plan of Share Exchange and Share Exchange Agreement dated
February 16, 1995 among URJ, Midwest Railroad Construction and Maintenance Corporaiion of
Wyoming, a Wyoming corporation ("Midwest"), Robert D. Wolff ("RD Wolff 0 and Judith J.
Wolff ("JJ WolOT), URI acquired ail outstanding shares of Midwest 6om RD Wolff and JJ Wolff
b exchange for 590,000 restricted shares of authorized but unissued shares of URI (the "Share
Exchange Agreement").
H.
In April of 1996 URI and Midwest, RD Wolff and JJ Wolff entered into a
Split-Off Agreement pursuant to which the Shire Exchange Agreement was rescinded in a
Tansaction intended to qualify as a tax-free spin-off under the provisions of Section 355 of the
f
nitrnal Revenue Code of 1986 (the "Recision Agreement").
I.
On April 5,1996 URI entered into a letter of bunt with IMC to sell a controlling
rarest in URI to IMC'upon terms and conditions set forth therein (the "IMC Letter of Intent"),
Cached as Exhibit A and by this reference made a pan hereof. The IMC Letter of Intent was
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jnocificd pursuant to a letter of May 31, 1996, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 3 and by
this reference made a part hereof. The IMC tetter of Intent is modified pursuant to the terms
and conditions of this Agreement.
J.

Fife is the sole shareholder of IMC.

KOn May 17, 1996. a Complaint captioned as Mark Technology Corp., et. al v.
Utah Resources International, Inc., et. al. was filed as Civil No. 96 090 3332CY in the Third
Judicial Court of Salt Lake County, Umh (the "Second State Action").
L.
The Second State Action included a request by MTC and others for a temporary
restraining order and injunction against the transactions contemplated In the IMC Letter of
Intent, which request shall be rescinded in accordance with the terms and conditions of this
Agreement.
M.
The Parties believe this Agreement is fair to end in the best interest of URI and all
• shareholders of URI.
N.
The Parties have agreed to compromise znd settle all of their disputes and claims
known or unknown, now existing or hereafter accruing, including, but not limited to, those which
are the subject of the Pending Litigation, upon the terms and conditions set forth herein.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the murual covenants ut forth herein and fur
other good and valuable consideradon, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby
acknowledged, the parties a^rce as follows:
1.

Unless otherwise provided, the following events shall occur at Closing (as defined

herein):
a.
The Taracs egrcc they will use best efforts immediately following the
Closing to pedtion the Court in the First State Action for the purpose ofterminatingthe
1993 Settlement Agreement Pending such termination, the Parties agree the 1993
SerJement Agreement and the Murphy Order shall continue in accordance with their
respective terms and provisions.
b.
The Parties agree to dismixs the Pending Litigation with prejudice, to
dismiss the Order to Show Cause referenced in the Recitals above, and agree to request
the Court to remove the temporary restraining order granted in the Second Stale Action
on the date of execution of this Agreement The Panics a^jec. upon execution of this
Agreement, to take immediate steps to file for dismissal of the Pending Litigation. The
Parties will use their best effons, in good faith, to obtain the rtimKsah within 60 days of
the dale hereof. Notice shall be given to shareholders of URI in such manna is cich
covin direct:.
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c.
The closing of the transactions contemplated herein ("Closing") jhzil
occur at the offices of Robinson &. Sheen in Salt Lake City, Utah, no later thao seven (7)
calendar days after the date hereof.
d.
Except for those matters specifically set forth in this Agreement which
creaie continuing future rights and obligations of the Parties, the Panics hereto, and czch
of them, for themselves, their respective predecessors, subsidiaries, controlled and
controlling affiliated corporations and entities, past and. present, as well as the respective
directors, officers, stockholders, partners, agents, attorneys, servants, and employee^ past
and present, and affiliates or nominees of parties (as defined under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934), heirs, assigns, predecessors and successors in interest, and each
of them, effective upon Closing of this Agreement, hereby acknowledge full and
complete satisfaction of, and do hereby release and discharge and covenant not to sue the
other of them, including their respective heirs, assigns and successors in interest, parents,
predecessors, subsidiaries, controlled .and controlling affiliated corporations and entities,
past and present, as well as the respective directors, officers, stockholders, partners,
agents, attorneys, servants, and employees, past and present, and affiliates or nominees of
parties (as defined under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), and each of them, from
any and all claims, demands, and cause* or sources of action of whatever kind or nature,
known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, including all rights of and claims for
contribution and indemnification, and judgments, which any of them now owns or holds
or has at any time heretofore owned or held through the date of the Closing of this
Agreement against any of the other of them, including, but not limited to, those which:
(i) art or could have been alleged or set forth in any of the pleadings, any interlocutor)'or
final orders, rulings, file, or papers in the Pending Litigation; or (ii) arise out of, or are
related to, or are in any way connected directly or indirectly with any transactions,
occurrences, acts or omissions set forth, or facts alleged, in the papers on fdc in the
Pending Litigation. This provision shall receive the broadest possible interpretation as a
general and complete release.
URI agrees to and shall fully indemnify hold harmless, and defend all other
Parties to this Agreement including their respective hcin, assigns and successors in
interest, parents, predecessors, subsidiaries,* controlled and! affiliated corporations and
entities, past and present, as well as the respective directors, officers, stockholders,
partners, agents, attorneys, servants, and employees, past and present, and affiliates or
nominees of parties (as defined under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), and each of
them, from and against any and all claims, demands, and causes or sources of action of
whatever kind or nature, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, including all
rights of and claim* fur contribution and indemnification, and judgments; which
Midwest, RD Wolff or J J Wolff now own* or holds or has at any time heir to fore owned
or held through the date of the Closing of this Agreement against any of the Parlies hereto
other than URI, including, but not limited to, those which (i) are or could have been
alleged or set forth in any of the pleadings, any interlocutory or final orders, rulings, file,
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ur papers in the First State Action; or (ii) arise out of, or are related to, or are in any way
connected directly or indirectly with any trsnsccuons, occurrences, nets or onissions set
forth, or facts alleged, in the papers on file in the First State Action; (iii) axe or could have
been alleged or set forth in any of the pleadings, any interlocutory or final orders, rulings,
file, or papers in the Second Stale action: or (iv) arise out of or arerelatedor are in any
way connected directly or indirecdy with any transaction, occurrences, acts or omissions
set forth, or facts alleged, in the papers on file in the Second State Action; or (v) arise out
of, or are related to, or are in any way connected with any transactions, occurrences, aces
or omissions set forth, or facts alleged, in the papers on file in said Federal Action;
(vi) arise out of, are related to, or are in any way connected directly or indirectly with the
Share Exchange Agreement or the Rccision Agreement; (YU) arise out of, arc related to,
or are in any way connected directly or indirectly with the 1993 Settlement Agreement; or
(viii) arise out of, or art related to, or are in any way connected directly or indirectly with
the IMC Letter of Intent.
e.
The Parties agree that Jones shall serve as a director of URI for no less
than one year from the date of Closing, and the Parlies agree to take all actions necessary
to maintain Jones as a director for said one year period. Sheen and Erickson shall resign
as members of the Board of Directors of URI as of the date of Closing. The successors to
Sheen and Erickson as members of the Board of Directors of URI shall be appointed in
accordance with the terms of the 1993 Settlement Agreement. Thai Bcwd shall elect Fife
President and the other appropriate officers of URI. Erickson and Sheen agree that they
will not seek election an, And will nor accept any fmurc nominations to serve as, an officer
or director of URI or Morgan Gas &. Oil Co.
f.
The transactions contemplated in the IMC Letter of Intent shall close in
accordance with the provisions of that coruemplatcd Stock Purchase Agreement betw^n
URI and rMC (the "Stock Purche^c Agreement"), the current form of which is attached
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit MC," subject to negotiation and
execution of the definitive Stock Purchase Agreement aod approval of its terms by the
URI Board of Directors; provided, however, that the definitive Stock Purchase
Agreement must contain the following material provisions:
i.
IMC shall purchase and URI shall issue and sell shares at the Closing so that IMC
will own following the purchase 50.5% of the total outstanding common stock of URI at
S3.35 per share as of the Closing, and URI shall bsue an option for one hundred titty
thousand (150,000) o: more additional shares of the capital stock of the Company at an
exercise price of S3.35 per share, payable in the same fashion as the shares purchased by
IMC to obtain 50.5% of the total outstanding stock of URI, such that IMC shall have at
all times the right to own 50.5% of the outstanding common stock of URI; provided,
however, that the options may only be exercised as corresponding outstanding options
held by others are exercised; and further provided that IMC shall be entitled to maintain
its 50.5% ownership of the outstanding common stock of URJ in connection with any
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siock split, ncipiiaJizarion, combination, or reorganization; and further provided iha:
IMC shall be cntitied to maintain its 50.5% ownership of the outstanding common stock
of URI in connection with any new issuance of stock or the issuance of instruments
convertible into stock, at the offering price of such new issuance, on payment tenns
similar to those set forth herein;
ii.

IMC shall pay 15% of the purchase price La cash at closing;

iii.
the bdincc of the purchase price shall be evidenced by a note ("Note") which
bears interest a; a rate equal to the short-term applicable federal rate published by the Internal
Revenue Service, pursuant to Section 1274(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
imended, in effect at the time of the Closing, adjusted on each anniversary date of this
Agreement until the purchase price has been paid in full.
iv.
IMC shall pay the first year's interest in cash at Closing, discounted at the interest
rate noted in (iii) above, and interest shall be paid annually in arrears on each anniversary of the
Note thereafter, beginning with the second year's anniversary dale, with the principal due and
payable August 1, 2001;
v.

the Note shall be secured by a pledge oflMCs URI stock;

vi.
John Fife, the sole shareholder and president of IMC, will personally guarantee
twenty-five percent (25%) of the outstanding balance of the Note;
vii.
after closing, any distributions and other paynicuts otherwise payable to IMC on
LLS URJ stock will be applied to reduce the outstanding principal balance of the Note;
viiL
subsequent to closing, IMC shall cause URI to cause a 1,000 to I share reverse
split at S3.35 per shire;
ix.
fractional shareholders of record as of the date of 6 c reverse split shall be given
he option to purchase additional fractional shares to round up to the next whole share;
x.
URI indemnifies IMC, its shareholders, officers, directors, agents, employees and
uiomcys, including but not limited to those arising out of the negotiation, execution and
consummation of this Agreement, and including advancement of their legal fees and cocu, and
lom and against liability arising out of the EMC Letter of Intent, the Stock Purchase Agreement
Lad transactions contemplated hereby;
».
IMC shall take all actions necessary to cause URI to honor its obligations to
ndemnify its officers and directors, agents, employees and anomcys, including but not limited to
hose arising out of the negotiation, execution and consummation of this Agreement, and
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eluding advancement of their legal fees and costs, La connection with all present and future
Litigation.
xii.
URI shall hire Fife under a written crr.ployrnciu agreement which shall provide
xasonable compensation for servicesrendered,which compensation to any year shall not exceed
£200,000. The payment of compensation to excess of that provided to the employment
agreement shall be used to reduce any obligations due or to become doc under ihc Note.
xiii. The Parties covenant to provide a copy of the definitive Stock Purchase
Agreement to Jones and counsel of his choosing a; least two days prior to the Closbg, to review
for consistency with the provisions above.
f.
The number of shares acquired by URI in thereversesplit contemplaied to
the Stock Purchase Agreement shall be available for purchase by all remaining
shareholders of URI, other than IMC, as of a record dale five days prior to the
effectuation of the reverse split ai a price of S3.35 per share; provided, however, that URI
shall not berequiredto make the shares available for purchase if to do so would be to
violation of federal or state securities laws after .after URI has taken all actions necessary
to comply. Notice shall be given to the shareholders of the availability of such purchase
and to the extent the amount of shares available is oversubscribed, each person
subscribing for such shares shall be allowed to purchase a pro-rata portion of the
available shares. The terms of the purchase of such shares by each shareholder shall be a
cash down payment of 25% with the balance payable in three years widb simple interest at
the short term applicable federal rate for the month of this Agreement which interest shall
be payable annually in arrears. The obligation shall be secured by a pledge of the stock
acquired pursuant to a stock pledge agreement to be drafted by counsel for URI. Any
dkribudora to shareholders of URI shall lint be applied to the unpaid balance of any
amounts owing URI hereunder.
g.
The 40,552 outstanding shares of URI stock owned by A Morgan and
V Morgan, which they represent and wan-ant are all the URI shares they own, shall be
purchased by URI for a cash price of S3.35.per share which purchase shall occur at
Closing of this Agreement.
h.
Legal fees and expenses and other costs associated with the Pending
Litigation and the documents and negotiations to complete and implement the settlement
contemplated by this Agreement shall be paid as follows:
(i) AH legal fees, costs and out-of-pocket expenses incurred or paid by
Jones, IMC, Fife, Erickson, Sheen, Hurd and MTC from January 1,1996 to
Closing shall bereimbursedor paid by URI.
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(ii) All legal fees, conj and ou of jy%ci-ct expenses incurred or paid by
V. Morgan and A Morgan, subject to a dollar limiiarion of SS 1,000, shall Jv
reimbursed or paid by URI.
(iii) All other expenses incurred, except as provided above, shaJl be paid
by the Parr)' incurring such expense.
i.
From the dale of this Agreement URI shall be allowed to conduct its
affairs in the normal course of business, except as otherwise limited or modified by the
First State Action, the 1993 Settlement Agreement and the Murphy Order.
j.
All employment agreements contemplated, negotiated or executed
between URI and Sheen, Hard, and Erickson shall not be effectuated and, if effectuated,
shall be terminated.
k.
Except for completion of pending matters approved by the Board,
Robinson &. Sheen, JLL.C. shall rtsign as legal counsel for URI effective at Closing.
1.
The Parties hereto-shall exercise their "best efforts to account for, pay,
compromise, unwind, and/or terminate all existing contracted relationships between UPJ
and Morgan Gas & Oil Co.
4-

Representations and Warranties of the Parries.

a.
The corporate Parries, URI, MTC, and IMC represent and warrant that
they are validly existing and in good standing in the state of their organimnon and have
the full legal righi, power and authority to execute and deliver this Agreement and to
cany out all transactions contemplated herein. Each individual signing this Agreement
on bchali'of a corporation, partnership, trust, or other entity, represents and warrants that
he or she has the authoricy to do so.
b.
All Parries represent and warrant that they have negotiated at aims-length
with a view to arriving al a fair and equitable settlement of their difference.
c.
All Parties represent end warrant that, to the best of their belief the terms
of this Agreement are fair to and in the best interests of URI and its shareholders.
d.
All Parties covenant that no actions of any kind shall be undertaken by the
Parties to affirmatively prosecute the Pending Litigation, nor will the Parties instigate any
now Icgd proceedings against any of the other Parties.
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c
All Panics represent and warrant that they have not assigned or transferred
any claims against any of the other Panics, including any interest in the Peking
Litigation, to any third party not a pany to this Agreement.
5.
This Agreement has been freely and voluntarily executed by all Parties hereto
^r having been apprised of all relevant information and having been represented by counsel.
0 party hereto has relied upon any mducemcnts, promises or irpresenudons made by ar.y other
sjrry or other party's attorney, other than those specifically set out in this Agreement, which
institutes the entire, integrated understanding among the Parties.
6.
Each party agrees to perform such other further acts and to execute and deliver
ch further documents as m2y be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this Agreement.
7.
"The Parties hereto, and each of them, acknowledge that this Agreement is the
impromise and settlement of the claims and demands between and among the Parties and
ithing contained herein shall be construed as an admission of their validity or invalidity against
e interests of the Parties hereto, or any of thcmt except thai this disclaimer does not affect the
Jidity or truthfulness of the affirmative statements, admissions, affidavits, filings, notices, and
ritings made and agreed to be made under the terms of this Agreement
8.
Except as to continuing covenants and obligations set forth in the 1993 Settlement
grecment and ilic Murphy Order, all claims, rights, causes of action, or defenses of the Parties
Lsed in the Pending Litigation are herewith merged into and folly resolved as a pan of this
grecment.
9.
All Parties to this Agreement have read and fully comprehend and understand the
ms and provisions of this Agreement and of the ancillary exhibits and documents incorporated
rein. All Parties have been advised by legal counsel who presently represent them in
nncction with this settlement as to the content, meaning and execution of this Agreement. All
LTDC3 to this Agreement have voluntarily and without coercion signed the same and understand
d agree to each and every paragraph hereof.
10.
No Party hereto shall, directly-or indirectly, solicit or se*k to solicit any penon to
idlenge any provision hereof or to file suit comparable to any suit dismissed hereunder or to
ntest the dismissal of the Pending Litigation. This covenant of good faith shall be central to
is Agreement and any Party damaged by a breach thereof shall be entitled to all remedies
ailable at law or in equity as well as a recovery of reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
11.

General Provisions.

a.
Binding Agreement. This Agreement shall be binding upon and dull
inure to the benefit of the heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns, as
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applicable, of ih: respective parties hereto, 2nd any entities requiting fron: the
reorganization, consolidation 0: merger of my parry hereto.
k.
Headings. The headings used in this Agreement are inserted for reference
purposes only and shall not be deemed to limit or affect in any way the meaning or
interpretation of any of Ihe terms or provisions of this Agreement.
c.
Counterparts. This Agreement may be signed upon any number of
counterparts with the same effect as if the signature to any counterpcrt were upon the
same instrument
d.
Entire Agreement. This Agreement, together with the exhibits and
schedules hereto (which are incorporated herein by this reference), constitutes the entire
agreement and understanding between and among the parties with respect to the subject
matter hereof and shall supersede any prior agreements and understandings among the
parties with rejpect to such subject matter.
e.
Severability. The provisions of this Agreement are severable, and should
any provision hereof be found to be void, voidable or unenforceable, such void, voidable
or unenforceable provision shall not affect any other portion or proyisionof this
Agreement.
f.
Survival of Representations. Warranties and Covenants. The
representations, warranties end covenants of the Panics shall survive the Closing.
g.
Waiver. Any waiver by any party hereto of any breach of any kind or
character whatsoever by any other party, whether such waiver be direct or implied, shall
not be construed as a continuing waiver or consent to any subsequent breach of this
Agreement on the pan of the other parry.
h.
Modification. This Agreement may not be modified except by an
instrument in writing signed by aJl of the parties hereto.
I.
governing Law. This Agreement shall be interpreted, construed and
enforced according to the law$ of the Stata of Utah.
j.
AttomevS Fees. In the event any action or proceeding is brought by any
Party against any other Party under this Agreement the prevailing party shall be cnndcd
to recover attorney's fees and costs in such amount as the court may adjudge reasonable.
k.
Notice. All notices or other communications required or permitted to be
given pursuant to this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be considered as properly
yven when personally served or deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
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registered or csnified, with rcniru receipt requested, or by prepaid telegram, telecopy or
deposited with a recognized courier for overnight delivery. Notice given in any such
manner shail be effective when received or three (3) days after mailing or sending. Tc:
addresses of the parties shall be as set forth on Schedule 1 l.j. anached hereto.
£nch Pert}' shall have therightto change its address for purposes of this section to any other
location within the continental United Stales hy giving thirty (30) days' notice to the other Parties
in the manner sci forth in this section.
11.
In the event that Closing does not occur for any reason, the term of the 1993
ScrJemcnt Agreement shall be extended by the number of days elapsing between the date hereof
and the dale of the event causing tha failure to close.
DATED the date and year flnt set forth above.
URLUtah Resources International, Inc., a Utah
corporation

By:.
Its:
ERICKSON:

R. Dec Erickson
SHEEN:

E. Jay«Sheen /
HURD:

Lyle D. Hurd
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x

JONES:

Max* G. Jones

£/

MTC:
Mark Technologies Corporation, t
California corporation

A MORGAN:

Anne Morgan, individually.
V MORGAN:

Victoria Morgan
INTER-MOUNTAIN CAPITAL CORP, a
Delaware corporation

I t v / ^ Prgigrc^g^'
FIFE

John^
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foM

ROBINSON & SHEEN, L.LC.

3>-i

lis:

APPROVED:
Jenny T. Morgan
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"f*^

DATED

Cf C e

^ with rctoi r = ~ ,

the di^« «»< v ««.« .

_

,
VRI:
veponHoa

*Utai»

SUCKSON:

R. Dee Eraik^ji
SHEEN:

HURD:

Lyl< D. Hud

Pa*c

<*W

.Tiller shiH b> cffrcdv? vfezyjif1* o f ; ^ ; ' p ? ^ ^ f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ s ' ' ^
odcIwKs efths put id xhill bo u si Iory:. M "??ocf,c j ^ '

7 l L

^ 4~l~~

-• - - * -. ... *~—V-r/r'-v-:£v-Q^::^
loa.io: within ih: > ^ f f i h f t f t 5 Su,» b7jMngjt^ (30) ^

"»** ta *»» ogTgg

" • 'IT. • • *fciK e^nKh C l n l m ^ ^ ^ f e ? ^ ' ' - f ^

-; ^ "

DATED Ow dax ind yW fiiiiKUOrth »bj>vc.-f.-'' •

.Uuh RJtwurcci Inicrcatioaal, Inc., s Uuh
csxponition

By:.
Itr.
ERJCXSON:

R, Dec Ericbon
SHEEN:

E; Jay Sb«n
KURD

^yitD.Hunl

an

JONES:
S

7)fj/JJCL^

Mar£ G~ Joocs

£y

MTC:
Mark Technologies Corporaxioii, a

California corporation

A MORGAN:

^^=rr^>
Anne Morgan, imicciually.
V MORGAN:

Victoria Morgan
INTER-MOUNTAJN CAPITAL CORP, a

Delaware corporation

lts. ,<: ^^FrT^j?rc^^''
FIFE

P*£Cl2

EXHIBIT "B"

EMPLO YMHNT AGREEMENTVtzh RMOUTCCJ International, 'ire. (TJRT1) tsnsu to trr$by Join hi Fi& w tip
4a ajioiAJ llkjy of S LPS ,000.00 prr yarn
i

Utth Resource* lrtrran tiocriy i x .

TUTrt. P.62

EXHIBIT "C"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARK TECHNOLOGIES CORP., a
California corporation, and
MARK JONES,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No.

Plaintiffs,

980900576MI

Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA

vs .

Court Clerk: Marcy
UTAH RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL,
INC., a Utah corporation, JOHN
FIFE, DAVID FIFE, LYLE D. HURD
JR., GERRY BROWN individuals,

Thorne

January 5, 2000

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendants'

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

and

Plaintiffs'

Cross-

Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' First, Second, Third,
Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Claims for Relief.

The Court

heard

oral argument with respect to these motions on November 11, 1999.
Following the hearing the matters were taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits
attached thereto, and for the good cause that has been shown hereby
enters the following ruling.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

Mark

Jones

(Jones")

International, Inc.

was

a director

of

Utah

Resources

("URI") from January, 1996 through
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December 11, 1997,
2.

Jones is the controlling shareholder of Mark Technologies
Corporation("MTC"), a California corporation with offices
located in San Francisco, California.

3.

MTC is a shareholder of URI.

4.

URI is a Utah corporation with its principal place of
business located in St. George, Utah.

5.

John Fife is the President and Chief Executive Officer of
URI.

6.

In April of 1996, URI entered into a letter of intent
with Inter-Mountain Capital Corporation ("IMCC") for the
sale to IMCC of a controlling number of URI shares.

7.

Jones and MTC sued URI, certain then-directors, IMCC,
Fife, and others to enjoin the sale of a controlling
interest in URI.

8.

In June 1996, Jones, MTC, URI and several olher parties
entered into a Settlement Agreement.

9.

Jones and MTC filed this suit alleging breach of the
Settlement Agreement.
STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is proper when the affidavits and evidence
on file demonstrate that plaintiff cannot establish any set of
facts that would entitle him to judgment.

Abdulkadir v. Western

PAGE 3

MTC v. URI

Pacific R.R., 318 P.2d 339 (Utah 1957).

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Summary judgment is used

to dispense with unnecessary and unjustified litigation.
Reliable Furn. Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, 398
P.2d 685 (Utah 1965).

A party may not rely upon allegations in

the pleadings to counter affidavits made upon personal knowledge
stating facts contrary to those alleged in the pleadings.
Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975).

Freed
"[B]are

contentions, unsupported by any specification of facts in support
thereof, raise no material questions of fact as will preclude the
entry of summary judgment.,/

Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 609

P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980) .
ANALYSIS
Turning first to the Settlement Agreement itself, it is
important to note that it contains an integration clause on page
9, §5, and on page 10, §11(d).

This is critical because a

contract that includes a term indicating it is integrated is
presumed to be integrated.
665 (Utah 1985) .

Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663,

Furthermore, a contract that is integrated must

have its integrity maintained by not admitting parole evidence.
Id.

Accordingly, the terms of the Settlement Agreement should be

given their plain and ordinary meaning.

Warburton v. Va. Beach

Fed's Savings & Loan Ass'n, 889 P.2d 779, 783-84, (Utah ct. App.
1995).

MTC v. URI

A.

PAGE 4

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Claim One
Claim One involves an alleged promise by John Fife and URI

to enter into a contract of employment.

Plaintiffs allege

defendants breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing arising from the Settlement Agreement because they failed
to timely enter into an appropriate contract of employment.

A

plain reading of the Settlement Agreement, however, shows it
merely requires that the Stock Purchase Agreement include a
clause requiring an employment agreement-which the Stock Purchase
Agreement does.
Accordingly, because the Settlement Agreement does not
require an employment agreement, and because Fife and URI
fulfilled the requirement by including the clause in the Stock
Purchase Agreement, there was no breach of good faith and fair
dealing as alleged by plaintiffs.

Further, plaintiffs have no

right to enforce the Stock Purchase Agreement.

Indeed, neither

the law nor the Settlement Agreement grant plaintiffs the right
to sue on contracts they did not sign.
B.

Claim Two
The Settlement Agreement requires that

NN

[t]he parties hereto

shall exercise their best efforts to account for, pay,
compromise, unwind and/or terminate all existing contractual
relationships between URI and Morgan Gas and Oil."

Plaintiffs

MTC v. URI
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allege defendants took no meaningful action to wind up until this
lawsuit was filed.

However, URI presented uncontroverted

evidence that it had been in the process of unwinding the
partnerships identified in the Settlement Agreement, according to
the terms of the Agreement, for an extended time prior to the
filing of Plaintiffs' lawsuit.
C.

Claim Three
The third claim involves promises made by and between URI,

Gerry Brown and Lyle Hurd.

Specifically, plaintiffs contend

these defendants are obligated under the Settlement Agreement to
rescind outstanding stock options, or, in the alternative, to
redact Schedule 2.2 of the Stock Purchase Agreement.
After reviewing the Settlement Agreement, it is clear there
is no term within it which requires the defendants to rescind any
purported stock options.

Plaintiffs ask the Court to read a

clause into the integrated Settlement Agreement that requires the
redaction of the purported stock options.

However, the clause

does not exist and any attempt to read it into an integrated
contract is impermissible.

Finally, even if URI was required to

rescind the Schedule 2.2 of the Stock Purchase Agreement, the
issue would be moot as Brown and Hurd have waived, in writing,
any claim to URI stock options.
for URI to rescind or redact.

Accordingly, there is nothing
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Claim Four
With this claim, plaintiffs seek to have the stock options,

which were allegedly part of the employment agreements,
terminated.

Specifically, plaintiffs note that pursuant to the

Settlement Agreement, "[a]11 employment agreements contemplated,
negotiated or executed between URI and Sheen, Hurd, and Erickson
shall not be effectuated, and if effectuated, shall be
terminated."
According to the uncontroverted affidavits provided by
defendants, however, none of the aforementioned individuals have
given effect to any employment agreements.
was nothing to terminate.

Consequently, there

Further, there is no evidence that

anyone has even attempted to give effect to the stock options
since the waivers were executed in March 1998 or since the
Settlement Agreement was signed.

Accordingly, because under the

Agreement's plain language URI is not required to terminate
employment agreements which have not been given any effect, there
is no breach and summary judgment in defendants' favor is
appropriate.
E.

Claim Five
Pursuant to paragraph l.h of the Settlement Agreement,

"[a]11 legal fees , costs and out-of-pocket expenses incurred or
paid by Jones. . . and MTC from January 1, 1996 to Closing shall
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In accordance with this

provision, plaintiffs, in their fifth claim for relief seek
reimbursement of clerical expenses.
In its July 17, 1998 Order, this Court held that the
Settlement Agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face and it
does not allow for reimbursement of legal fees, costs and out-ofpocket expenses incurred or paid by plaintiffs after July 3, 1996
for matters covered by the Settlement Agreement.

According to

defendants, they have paid all expenses, costs and fees properly
submitted for payment during this time.

Plaintiffs have not

presented admissible evidence of any expenses covered under the
Settlement Agreement that have not already been paid.

Indeed,

plaintiffs admit in their response to URI's undisputed facts that
at least some of the costs submitted for reimbursement include
expenses incurred after closing, and these are not reimbursable.
Based upon the forgoing, and in accord with the Court's prior
ruling, summary judgment in defendants' favor on this issue is
appropriate.
F.

Claim Six
With this claim, plaintiffs allege that John Fife and Lyle

Hurd signed the Settlement Agreement without ever intending to
perform in the future.

To succeed on this claim, plaintiffs must

prove by clear and convincing evidence that at the time Fife and
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Hurd signed the agreement they had no intention to perform.
Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Core, 883 P.2d 285 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).

In the instant case, however, plaintiffs have only

provided the alleged opinion of Mark Jones in the Amended
Complaint.

Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

plaintiffs, this allegation does not satisfy the clear and
convincing burden.
G.

Claim Seven
With this claim, plaintiffs seek to have the stock options

declared void.

As discussed with respect to claim three,

however, such a declaration is unnecessary as all parties who
plaintiffs contend have claims for stock options have disclaimed
any such interests.
H.

Claim Eight
With this claim, plaintiffs allege that John Fife, David

Fife, Lyle Hurd and Gerry Brown have breached a fiduciary duty
owed to them as individuals and further allege that such breach
entitles them to specific performance, injunctive relief and
damages.
As an initial matter, despite plaintiffs' argument to the
contrary, the Court finds that the actual language contained in
the Amended Complaint is clearly more akin to a derivative
action-which would make these plaintiffs not the proper
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plaintiffs to bring this claim as a matter of law.

Indeed, any

fiduciary duty is owed to the corporation and shareholders
collectively, not individually.

Richardson v. Arizona Fuels

Corp., 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980).
Further, even if the Court were to agree with plaintiffs
that they are asserting a direct action, it is well established
in Utah that "no fiduciary duty runs from directors and officers
to individual shareholders."

Lochhead v. Alacano, 662 F. Supp.

230, 233 (D. Utah 1987); Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614
P.2d 636, 638 (Utah 1980); Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v.
Liberty West Dev., Inc., 1998 WL 809612 at p.6 (Utah).
I.

Claim Nine
Plaintiffs concede that due to the pending lawsuit in St.

George they are not proper plaintiffs to maintain the derivative
action as asserted in this claim.
J.

Claim Ten
With Claim Ten, plaintiffs contend Jones is entitled to

reimbursement of expenses he incurred during his tenure as
director.

Defendants oppose this motion arguing URI compensates

directors $200.00 for every board meeting and reimburses for
expenses that received prior authorization.
According to the July 17, 1998 Order of this Court,
plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that a different corporate
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To date, plaintiffs have not produced any

evidence to refute defendants' multiple affidavits that URI does
not reimburse directors for non-approved expenses.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the forgoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on

Plaintiffs' First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth
Claims for Relief is denied.
This Memorandum Decision constitutes the order regarding the
matters addressed herein.
DATED this

V^

No further order is required.

day of January, 2000.
3Y THE COURT
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EXHIBIT "D"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARK TECHNOLOGIES CORP., a
California corporation, and
MARK G. JONES, an individual,
MEMORANDUM

DECISION

Plaintiffs,
Case No.

980900576MI

vs .
Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA
UTAH RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL,
INC., a Utah corporation, JOHN
FIFE, DAVID FIFE, LYLE D. HURD, j
Jr. and GERRY BROWN,

Court Clerk: Marcy

Thorne

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
"Defendants' Motion for Judgment Order Awarding Attorney's Fees and
Costs Against Plaintiffs."

The Court heard oral argument with

respect to the motion on January 4, 2001.

Following th hearing,

the matter was taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits
attached thereto and for the good cause shown hereby enters the
following ruling.
With this motion, defendant, Utah Resources International,
Inc. ("URI"), seeks the entry of a judgment order in its favor and
against plaintiffs, Mark Technologies Corp. ("MTC") and Mark Jones
("Jones"), jointly and severally, for reasonable attorney's fees
and

costs

in

the

total

(revised)

amount

of

$162,028.87.
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Specifically, URI contends that pursuant to paragraph ll.j. of the
Settlement Agreement entered into by the parties, they are entitled
to fees and costs as the "prevailing party" in this action.
Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing URI's motion must be
rejected

because

recoverable
plaintiffs'

and

URI

failed

to

allocate

non-recoverable

position

many

of

its

fees.

the

fees

request

Furthermore,
are

duplicative

between
it

is

and/or

unreasonable.
Pursuant to paragraph ll.j. of the Settlement Agreement:
In the event any action or proceeding is
brought by any Party against any other Party
under this Agreement, the prevailing party
shall be entitled to recover attorney's fees
and costs in such amount as the court may
adjudge reasonable.
By virtue of the Court's January 5, 2000 Memorandum Decision,
URI is the prevailing party in this matter.

Indeed, although Jones

did in effect prevail on two motions, URI prevailed on all of
Jones' claims.

This fact, combined with the provision in the

Settlement Agreement awarding fees and costs to the prevailing
party in "any action or proceeding," entitles URI to recovery of
their fees and costs.

See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,

318. (Utah 1998).
Turning next to the issue or reasonableness of the requested
fees,

it

is

important

to note

that

in deciding

if

a

generally reasonable, the Court considers the following:

fee is
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(1) The time and labor required, the novelty
and difficulty of the questions involved and
the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly;
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client,
that
the
acceptance
of
the
particular
employment will preclude other employment by
the lawyer;
(3)
The fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar legal services;
(4) The amount involved and results obtained;
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client
or by the circumstances;
(6) The nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client;
(7) The experience, reputation and ability of
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;
and
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Barker

v.

Utah

Public

Service

Commission

Communications, Inc., 970P.2d 702, 708

and

U.S.

West

(Utah 1998).

After reviewing the submitted fees with the aforementioned in
mind, the Court is persuaded the complexity of the issues involved
in this case, combined with the experience and qualifications of
URI's counsel as well as the results achieved, merit an award of
the requested fees.

With specific regard to the Chicago law firm

of Wildman, Harrold, the Court finds Mr. White's billing rate of
$270 per hour is reasonable given his experience and role in the
case.

Moreover,

the

records

indicate

much

of

the

work

was

performed by more junior attorneys at Wildman, Harrold, who billed
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Furthermore, URI is entitled to

reimbursement of its fees and expenses associated with traveling to
Salt Lake City for argument on (1) URI's first Motion for Summary
Judgment;

(2) opposition

to Jones' Motion

Schedule;

and

second

(3)

URI's

Motion

to Extend

for

Summary

Discovery
Judgment.

Indeed, although URI has local counsel, the out of state attorneys
were the ones who were most

familiar with

the issues and who

drafted the legal memoranda and deposed the pertinent witnesses.
Indeed, the mere fact that URI hired a Chicago law firm to defend
in this litigation, rather than a Salt Lake City law firm, does
not, itself, provide a basis for denial of fees and costs.
Finally,

with

respect

to

duplication

of

efforts,

after

reviewing the records in this matter, the Court is not persuaded
the services of either Wildman, Harrold or Giauque, Crockett's
attorneys

were

repetitive

and

unnecessary.

As

noted,

the

delegation efforts by senior Wildman, Harrold attorneys actually
reduced the

ultimate fees.

Moreover, Giauque, Crockett's review

and analysis of pleadings, as well as their preparation for and
attendance

of

dispositive

hearings,

was

reasonable

under

the

circumstances.

1

Jones takes issue with Mr. White and Mr. Roth's supervision
of the junior attorney's. However, under the circumstances, such
delegation and supervision was not unreasonable and aided in
reducing the overall fees.
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Based upon the forgoing, Defendants' Motion for Judgment Order
Awarding Attorney's Fees and Costs Against Plaintiffs is granted.
DATED this

5?

day of January, 2001.
BY THE COURT
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FILED DISTRICT C0UBT
BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY
Rebecca S. Parr (#6628)
Wells Fargo Building
170 South Main, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801)533-8383

Third Judicial District

WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN & DIXON
Allen B. Roth
Craig M. White
225 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2800
Chicago, Illinois 60606
(312)201-2000

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
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DATE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARK TECHNOLOGIES CORP., a
California corporation, and
MARK JONES,
JUDGMENT ORDER
Plaintiffs,
vs.
UTAH RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL,
INC., a Utah corporation, JOHN
FIFE, DAVID FIFE, LYLE D. HURD
JR., GERRY BROWN, individuals,

Civil No. 980900576
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendants.

This action came on for final hearing on Defendants' Motion for Judgment Order
Awarding Attorney's Fees and Costs Against Plaintiffs on January 4, 2001. The issues having
been duly considered and the Court having rendered its Memorandum Decision on January 8,
2001.
Judgment Order @J

980900576

IITAI _, R F K O U R C F S

JD

It is Ordered and Adjudged that plaintiffs take nothing, that the action be dismissed on
the merits, and that defendants recover from plaintiffs $162,028.87, with interest at 8.052% as of
the date of this Judgment Order.
DATED this ^\j> day of February, 2001.
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Clerk of the Court

Judgment Debtors:
Mark Technologies Corporation
Mark Jones
12257 Business Park Drive, Ste. 10
Truckee, California 96161
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